Can decades of research on Operation Identification (Operation ID) reasonably support the effectiveness of My Property ID Registry (MPIDR)?
Yes. MPIDR preserves the principal mechanisms of Operation ID, a police-developed crime-prevention strategy dating to 1963. Historical evaluations provide an evidentiary foundation for anticipating comparable benefits when the modern implementation operates under similar conditions.
The distinction is important. MPIDR does not introduce an entirely new crime-prevention intervention. It modernizes an established approach built around physical property identification, ownership documentation, and visible warnings.[1]
The central question is whether the historical evidence supporting Operation ID can reasonably be extrapolated to MPIDR.
Monterey Park: The Origins of Operation ID
Operation ID began in Monterey Park, California, in 1963 under Police Chief Everett F. Holladay.
The program encouraged residents to engrave identifying numbers on personal property and display warning decals announcing their participation. The local Exchange Club supplied engraving equipment and decals, making the program inexpensive and accessible.[2]
Early reports described remarkable results.
In May 1971, Representative George E. Danielson entered an account of Monterey Park’s program into the Congressional Record. It reported the following burglary figures:
| Household participation | Reported burglaries |
|---|---|
| 3,000 participating households | 3 |
| 7,000 nonparticipating households | More than 1,000 |
Note: above figures represented cumulative reported experience over several years, not annual burglary rates. They also did not establish that the two groups were otherwise comparable.[3]
Nevertheless, the reported difference was substantial enough to attract national attention.
By June 1971, Holladay was describing Operation ID in the FBI’s Law Enforcement Bulletin, reporting approximately 4,000 participating households and adoption by 23 additional communities.[2]
The Monterey Park experience established the fundamental proposition behind Operation ID: marked property, recorded ownership information, and visible warnings could change the perceived risks associated with burglary.
However, subsequent federal evaluations raised questions about participant selection, crime displacement, and whether favorable results among participating households translated into community-wide burglary reductions.[4]
The early findings were promising, but not conclusive.
National Recognition and The New York Times
Operation ID was not an obscure local experiment.
Its expansion attracted the attention of law enforcement, civic organizations, federal policymakers, and the national press.
On July 21, 1972, The New York Times published Fred Ferretti’s article, “City Starts Burglary-Prevention Program,” documenting New York City’s adoption of a burglary-prevention initiative associated with Operation ID.[5]
The article’s bibliographic details are preserved in federal criminal-justice research publications.
The newspaper coverage is historically significant because it demonstrates that Operation ID had become part of the national conversation about practical crime prevention.
New York State subsequently developed a formal Operation Identification program using police-issued identification numbers and a two-part registration-card system connecting marked property with its owner.[6]
By the mid-1970s, Operation ID had become sufficiently widespread to warrant extensive federal evaluation.
What the Department of Justice Found
The U.S. Department of Justice’s National Evaluation Program examined Operation ID through field investigations, surveys, and reviews of existing programs.
Its findings were encouraging but qualified.
Participating households generally experienced lower burglary rates. However, the researchers could not establish consistent community-wide reductions or demonstrate substantial improvements in the recovery and return of stolen property.[4]
Participation emerged as a major obstacle.
In Denver, for example, an evaluation reported that property identification affected burglary rates among participating households, but the program enrolled only 14.9% of its targeted households against a 25% objective.[7]
The distinction between effectiveness among participants and effectiveness across an entire community is essential.
A crime-prevention intervention may benefit households that implement it without producing a measurable citywide reduction when relatively few residents participate.
The federal findings therefore did not establish that Operation ID was ineffective. They demonstrated that its observed benefits and its overall community impact were different questions.
The Welsh Study: Evidence Beyond the United States
Additional evidence emerged from Britain.
In 1985, Gloria Laycock published Property Marking: A Deterrent to Domestic Burglary?, evaluating an initiative in three Welsh communities: Trethomas, Graig-y-Rhacca, and Machen.[8]
The intervention combined property marking, police visits, publicity, and warning decals.
Approximately 70–75% of households participated.
Reported burglaries declined from 128 during the preceding 12 months to 74 during the following 12 months—approximately a 40% reduction.
Laycock concluded that publicity and visible warnings were likely important contributors to the program’s success. The research did not demonstrate improved property recovery or offender detection attributable to marking.[8]
This finding is particularly relevant to MPIDR.
The historical intervention was not simply engraving. It was a coordinated approach involving identification, documentation, and visible communication to prospective offenders.
The Welsh study supports evaluating those elements together rather than treating physical marking as an isolated measure.
Later research also documented mixed outcomes from property-marking initiatives, reinforcing the importance of implementation and participation.[9]
Is MPIDR Sufficiently Similar to Operation ID?
The critical question is whether MPIDR preserves the principal mechanisms underlying Operation ID’s intended effectiveness.
The correspondence is substantial.
| Operation ID mechanism | MPIDR equivalent |
|---|---|
| Permanent identification of personal property | Owner-applied asset identification tags |
| Recording identifying information | Online records of make, model, serial number, and OAN |
| Visible warnings to prospective burglars | Door and window warning decals |
| Public awareness of marked property | Neighborhood and community signage |
| Identification of recovered property | Identifiers linked to ownership records |
| Supporting police investigations and property returns |
Identifying information available for police reports and subsequent tracing |
Note: above are not incidental similarities. They represent substantial continuity in the intervention’s underlying crime-prevention mechanisms.[1][10]
Traditional Operation ID relied primarily on engraving tools, handwritten inventories, and police or household recordkeeping.
MPIDR employs individually numbered asset tags, internet-based ownership records, and a means of connecting recovered property with its recorded identifying information. This feature is traceable via the MPIDR FOUND page.
Participants can document an item’s make, model, serial number, and Owner Applied Number (OAN) before a theft occurs.
If an item is stolen, those identifiers can be included in the police report. If the property is recovered, the identifying information can assist in tracing it to its recorded owner.
The administrative technology has changed, but the underlying intervention remains substantially recognizable.
MPIDR is therefore more accurately characterized as a modern implementation of Operation ID than as an unrelated crime-prevention concept.
The 1979 GAO Report: A Persistent Identification Problem
Operation ID’s historical importance extends beyond burglary prevention.
In April 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued Department of Justice Should Explore the Feasibility of a Uniform Identification System for Marking Personal Property.[11]
The report addressed the difficulties associated with inconsistent property identification and the resulting obstacles to connecting recovered items with their rightful owners.
A uniform identification system offered a potential means of improving the identification and return of stolen property.
This distinction matters because preventing burglary and facilitating property recovery are related but separate objectives.
A visible warning may influence an offender’s decision to steal. An identifiable asset and corresponding ownership record may assist police after a theft has occurred.
MPIDR preserves both functions.
Its online registry provides a contemporary means of maintaining identifying information that might otherwise be unavailable when an owner reports a theft.
The ability to supply that information does not, by itself, prove improved recovery rates. Nevertheless, it addresses the same identification problem recognized in the GAO’s historical examination.
Can Operation ID’s Results Be Extrapolated to MPIDR?
The argument for extrapolation rests on the continuity of the intervention.
When a contemporary program preserves the essential mechanisms of an established practice, historical research remains relevant to assessing its likely effects.
MPIDR retains Operation ID’s central elements: property marking, ownership documentation, and visible warnings.
It also preserves the original objectives: making property less attractive to steal, improving the information available to police, and facilitating the identification and return of recovered property.
Its internet-based architecture changes the administration of those activities without fundamentally changing their purpose.
Accordingly, the historical findings provide a reasonable basis for anticipating comparable crime-prevention benefits under comparable conditions.
That does not establish that MPIDR has independently achieved the burglary reductions reported in Monterey Park, Wales, or other historical evaluations.
Nor does it establish that MPIDR produces higher recovery or conviction rates.
Those outcomes would require additional empirical evaluation.
A further consideration is that modern asset tags are not identical to engraved identifiers. Their durability, visibility, resistance to removal, and actual use by participants can influence whether the historical mechanisms operate as intended.
Such differences deserve evaluation, but they do not eliminate the relevance of the underlying research.
An Established Intervention in a Modern Form
Operation ID was developed by law enforcement, examined through federal research, adopted by communities across the country, and evaluated internationally.
Its results were not uniformly positive. Participation rates, publicity, implementation quality, and research limitations influenced the findings.
Nevertheless, the historical record provides an established evidentiary foundation for the intervention’s principal crime-prevention mechanisms.
MPIDR preserves those mechanisms while using contemporary technology to administer property identification and ownership documentation.
The absence of MPIDR-specific outcome studies should not be confused with an absence of evidence supporting the underlying intervention.
The strongest argument for MPIDR is not that the internet has reinvented crime prevention. It is that a researched, police-developed strategy remains substantially intact in its modern implementation.
The historical evidence supports a reasonable expectation of comparable benefits—not a guarantee of identical outcomes.
That is the appropriate evidentiary foundation for evaluating My Property ID Registry.
Footnotes and References
[1] My Property ID Registry. About the Product and Developer. Description of MPIDR’s asset identification tags, internet-based ownership registry, and warning decals. MPIDR documentation.
[2] Holladay, Everett F. (1971). “Operation Identification.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, June 1971, pp. 26–27. Holladay describes the origins, marking practices, warning decals, and expansion of the Monterey Park program. Original FBI publication (PDF).
[3] Congressional Record (1971). Remarks of Representative George E. Danielson concerning Operation Identification in Monterey Park, May 3, 1971, printed May 4, 1971. Includes the comparison between participating and nonparticipating households. Congressional Record (PDF).
[4] Heller, Nelson B., et al. (1975). Operation Identification Projects: Assessment of Effectiveness. National Evaluation Program, Phase I Summary Report. U.S. Department of Justice. See also Gill, A. D., Kolde, R. A., and Schimerman, S. R., Evaluation of Operation Identification—Phase I, Volumes 1 and 2. Federal evaluation (PDF).
[5] Ferretti, Fred (1972). “City Starts Burglary-Prevention Program.” The New York Times, July 21, 1972, p. 33. Bibliographic citation corroborated by federal criminal-justice publications. Federal bibliography (PDF).
[6] New York State Office of Crime Prevention (1978). Operation Identification Program Guide. NCJ 77271. Describes the state’s standardized identification-number and registration-card procedures. DOJ archive.
[7] Denver Police Department (1975). Operation Identification Final Report. NCJ 39817. Reports participation levels and findings concerning burglary among participating households. DOJ archive.
[8] Laycock, Gloria (1985). Property Marking: A Deterrent to Domestic Burglary? Home Office Crime Prevention Unit, Paper 3. London: Home Office. ISBN 0-86252-193-9. Original Welsh study (PDF).
[9] Chainey, Spencer. A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of the Impact of Forensic Property Marking in Decreasing Burglaries. Contemporary examination of property-marking effectiveness and earlier international evaluations. Research article.
[10] White, T. W., Regan, K. J., Waller, J. D., and Wholey, J. S. (1975). Police Burglary Prevention Programs. U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. NCJ 25997. DOJ archive.
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office (1979). Department of Justice Should Explore the Feasibility of a Uniform Identification System for Marking Personal Property. GGD-79-54, April 25, 1979. Historical discussion and report reference.
[12] Scottish Government (2014). What Works to Reduce Crime? A Summary of the Evidence. Part Three: Reducing the Opportunities for Offending. Reviews property marking, Laycock’s findings, and the role of publicity in crime prevention. Government evidence review.
